Sabotaging Civil Service Reform in Aid-Dependent Countries: Are Donors to Blame?

摘要

International development assistance has focused increasing resources on raising civil service capacity in low-income country administrations plagued by low pay, poor establishment controls, and the absence of merit-based human resource practice. At the same time, donors sabotage civil service capacity development over the longer term. Notwithstanding international accords calling on donors to curtail this behavior, collective action problems constrain donors from dismantling the projectized aid infrastructure that fragments government institutions. We identify practical implications of this collective action dilemma and explore alternative reform approaches. We examine an agency-level civil service reform (ACSR) in Cambodia, in comparative perspective, showing how strategic, incremental introduction of merit-based incentives yielded benefits in one ministry but faltered when the pilot was expanded to other agencies. To the extent that the accumulated ACSR experiences have achieved some, albeit limited, traction, they may offer a small but significant beacon for those seeking to move forward on civil service reform under difficult conditions.