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Multiple Market-Clearing Prices, Electricity Market Design and Price Manipulation

机译:多个市场结算价格,电力市场设计和价格操纵

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摘要

Multiple market-clearing prices arise from degenerate pricing conditions that can occur in electricity markets under economic dispatch. A stand-alone profitability test can distinguish transactions that are consistent with workably competitive markets from transactions that serve no economic purpose other than to manipulate prices and profit from other financial contracts. Generalizing this standard to the degenerate conditions that give rise to multiple market-clearing prices provides a principled solution, without undermining the market-design foundations that integrate economic dispatch, locational prices and financial transmission rights.
机译:多种市场清算价格是由在经济调度下电力市场中可能发生的退化定价条件引起的。独立的获利能力测试可以将与可行的竞争市场一致的交易与没有经济目的的交易区别开来,除了操纵价格和其他金融合同的利润外。将该标准推广到导致多个市场清算价格的退化条件下,可以提供一种原则性的解决方案,而不会破坏将经济调度,地域价格和金融转让权结合在一起的市场设计基础。

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