Medicare Payment Policy Creates Incentives For Long-Term Care Hospitals To Time Discharges For Maximum Reimbursement

摘要

Long-term care hospitals are postacute care facilities for patients requiring extended hospital-level care. These facilities are reimbursed by Medicare under a prospective payment system with a short-stay outlier policy, which results in substantially lower payments for patients discharged before a diagnosis-related group-specific short-stay threshold. Using Medicare data, we examined the impact of the short-stay policy on lengths-of-stay and Medicare reimbursement among patients in long-term care hospitals who require prolonged mechanical ventilation. After accounting for case-mix and facility-level differences, we found that discharges for reasons other than death in the period 2005-10 were most likely to occur on the day of or immediately after the short-stay threshold; this held true regardless of facility ownership. In contrast, live discharges in 2002-the year before the prospective payment system started phasing out cost-based payment-were evenly distributed around the day that later became the short-stay threshold. Our findings confirm that the short-stay outlier payment policy created a strong financial incentive for long-term care hospitals to time patient discharges to maximize Medicare reimbursement. The results suggest that the new very-short-stay policy implemented in December 2012 could have a similar effect.