Counterintervention on Behalf of the Syrian Opposition? An Illustration of the Need for Greater Clarity in the Law

摘要

More than two years and over 100,000 deaths after the first overt signs of dissidence, few would deny that the conflict in Syria has escalated into a full-fledged civil war. As reports of atrocities and growing sectarianism mounted, so did calls by many in the West to "do something" to help topple the Assad regime and bring peace to the embattled country. Such appeals peaked following the alleged large-scale use of chemical weapons by the regime, at which point a U.S. military strike appeared imminent despite President Obama's own doubts as to the legality of unilateral action. Although the prospects of a direct strike were greatly diminished by Assad's subsequent agreement to dismantle his chemical weapons stock, the U.S. government nonetheless stepped up its efforts against Assad, finally making good on longstanding promises to provide lethal aid to the opposition. Was this legal? To date; most analyses of the propriety of arming the rebels have emphasized policy over legal considerations. The few legal discussions that have taken place have almost unanimously concluded that intervention - whether in the form of direct military strikes or more indirect military assistance - would likely be illegal. Though one might argue that the downing of a Turkish jet and sporadic cross-border shelling by the Assad regime into Turkey constituted an "armed attack" permitting a forcible response under United Nations Charter Article 51, a response capable of seriously influencing the outcome of the Syrian conflict would be neither proportionate nor necessary. Other mainstream justifications are equally unavailing: Security Council authorization for intervention remains unlikely, and without such authorization, forcible action under the emerging doctrine of the "responsibility to protect," or "R2P," is unlikely to meet widespread approval.