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Enhancing board oversight on quality of hospital care: An agency theory perspective

机译:加强董事会对医院护理质量的监督:代理理论的视角

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摘要

Background: Community hospitals in the United States are almost all governed by a governing board that is legally accountable for the quality of care provided. Increasing pressures for better quality and safety are prompting boards to strengthen their oversight function on quality. Purpose: In this study, we aimed to provide an update to prior research by exploring the role and practices of governing boards in quality oversight through the lens of agency theory and comparing hospital quality performance in relation to the adoption of those practices. Methodology: Data on board practices from a survey conducted by The Governance Institute in 2007 were merged with data on hospital quality drawn from two federal sources that measured processes of care and mortality. The study sample includes 445 public and private not-for-profit hospitals. We used factor analysis to explore the underlying dimensions of board practices. We further compared hospital quality performance by the adoption of each individual board practice. Findings: Consistent with the agency theory, the 13 board practices included in the survey appear to center around enhancing accountability of the board, management, and the medical staff. Reviewing the hospital's quality performance on a regular basis was the most common practice. A number of board practices, not examined in prior research, showed significant association with better performance on process of care and/or risk-adjusted mortality: requiring major new clinical programs to meet quality-related criteria, setting some quality goals at the "theoretical ideal" level, requiring both the board and the medical staff to be as involved as management in setting the agenda for discussion on quality, and requiring the hospital to report its quality/safety performance to the general public. Practice Implications: Hospital governing boards should examine their current practices and consider adopting those that would enhance the accountability of the board itself, management, and the medical staff.
机译:背景:美国的社区医院几乎都由理事机构管理,理事机构对所提供的护理质量负有法律责任。要求更高质量和安全性的压力越来越大,这促使董事会加强了对质量的监督职能。目的:在本研究中,我们旨在通过代理理论的视角探索理事会在质量监督中的作用和做法,并比较采用这些做法的医院质量绩效,从而对先前的研究进行更新。方法:将2007年由政府治理研究所进行的一项调查中的董事会实践数据与从两个联邦来源(用于衡量护理和死亡率的过程)得出的医院质量数据合并在一起。该研究样本包括445家公立和私立非营利医院。我们使用因素分析来探索董事会实践的基本维度。我们通过采用每个单独的董事会实践进一步比较了医院质量绩效。调查结果:与代理理论相一致,调查中包含的13种董事会实践似乎集中在增强董事会,管理层和医务人员的责任制上。定期检查医院的质量表现是最常见的做法。许多委员会的实践未经过先前研究的检验,显示出与护理过程和/或风险调整后的死亡率更好的表现有显着关联:需要重大的新临床计划以满足与质量相关的标准,在“理论上确定了一些质量目标理想”级别,要求董事会和医务人员都像管理层一样参与制定质量讨论议程,并要求医院向公众报告其质量/安全绩效。实践的含义:医院管理委员会应检查其当前做法,并考虑采用那些可增强委员会本身,管理层和医务人员问责制的做法。

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