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Incentive Mechanism for Multiuser Cooperative Relaying in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks: A Resource-Exchange Based Approach

机译:无线自组织网络中多用户协作中继的激励机制:一种基于资源交换的方法

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This paper studies the resource allocation (RA) and the relay selection (RS) problems in cooperative relaying (CR) based multiuser ad hoc networks, and a multiuser cooperative game is proposed to stimulate selfish user nodes to participate in the CR. The novelty of the game scheme lies in that it takes explicit count of that a wireless user can act as a data-source as well as a potential relay for other users. Consider a user has the selfish incentive to consume his/her spectrum resource solely to maximize his/her own data-rate and the selection cooperation (SC) rule which restricts relaying for a user to only one relay is explicitly imposed. To stimulate user nodes to share their energy and spectrum resource efficiently in the Pareto optimal sense, first, we formulate the RA problem for multiuser CR as a bargaining game. By solving the Nash bargaining solution of the game, Pareto optimal RA for cooperative partners can be achieved. Next, to implement the SC-rule imposed RS, a simple heuristic is proposed with the main method being to maintain the long-term priority fairness for cooperative partner selection for each selfish user. The proposed RS with RA (RS-RA) algorithm has a low computational complexity of O(K~2), where K is the number of users in a network. Simulation results demonstrate the system efficiency and fairness properties of the proposed bargaining game theoretic RS-RA scheme.
机译:本文研究了基于协作中继(CR)的多用户ad hoc网络中的资源分配(RA)和中继选择(RS)问题,并提出了一种多用户协作游戏来刺激自私的用户节点参与CR。游戏方案的新颖之处在于,它明确地认为无线用户可以充当数据源以及其他用户的潜在中继。考虑到用户有一种自私的动机去消耗他/她的频谱资源,而仅仅是为了最大化他/她自己的数据速率,并且明确地施加了将用户的中继限制为一个中继的选择合作(SC)规则。为了刺激用户节点以帕累托最优意义有效地共享其能量和频谱资源,首先,我们将多用户CR的RA问题公式化为讨价还价游戏。通过解决游戏的纳什讨价还价解决方案,可以实现合作伙伴的帕累托最优RA。接下来,为了实施SC规则强加的RS,提出了一种简单的启发式方法,其主要方法是为每个自私用户维护合作伙伴选择的长期优先级公平性。所提出的带有RA的RS(RS-RA)算法具有O(K〜2)的低计算复杂度,其中K是网络中的用户数。仿真结果证明了所提出的讨价还价博弈理论RS-RA方案的系统效率和公平性。

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