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首页> 外文期刊>The Review of Economic Studies >Vertical Relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers:Inference with Limited Data
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Vertical Relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers:Inference with Limited Data

机译:制造商和零售商之间的垂直关系:有限数据推断

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摘要

In this paper,different models of vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers in the supermarket industry are compared.Demand estimates are used to compute price-cost margins for retailers and manufacturers under different supply models when wholesale prices are not observed.The purpose is to identify the set of margins compatible with the margins obtained from estimates of cost and to select the model most consistent with the data among non-nested competing models.The models considered are (1)a simple linear pricing model;(2)a vertically integrated model;and (3)a variety of alternative (strategic)supply scenarios that allow for collusion,non-linear pricing,and strategic behaviour with respect to private label products.Using data on yogurt sold in several stores in a large urban area of the U.S.the results imply that wholesale prices are close to marginal cost and that retailers have pricing power in the vertical chain.This is consistent with non-linear pricing by the manufacturers or high bargaining power of the retailers.
机译:本文比较了超市行业制造商和零售商之间不同的垂直关系模型,在没有观察到批发价格的情况下,需求估算用于计算不同供应模型下零售商和制造商的价格成本利润率,目的是确定一组与从成本估算中获得的利润相适应的利润集,并在非嵌套竞争模型中选择与数据最一致的模型。考虑的模型为(1)简单线性定价模型;(2)垂直整合模型(3)各种替代(战略)供应情景,这些情景允许对自有品牌产品进行合谋,非线性定价和战略行为。使用在美国大城市几家商店出售的酸奶数据结果表明批发价格接近边际成本,零售商在垂直链中具有定价权,这与金融机构的非线性定价是一致的零售商或讨价还价能力高。

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