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首页> 外文期刊>The New England journal of medicine >Public health measures to control the spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome during the outbreak in Toronto.
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Public health measures to control the spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome during the outbreak in Toronto.

机译:在多伦多爆发期间,采取了公共卫生措施来控制严重急性呼吸道综合症的蔓延。

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摘要

BACKGROUND: Toronto was the site of North America's largest outbreak of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). An understanding of the patterns of transmission and the effects on public health in relation to control measures that were taken will help health officials prepare for any future outbreaks. METHODS: We analyzed SARS case, quarantine, and hotline records in relation to control measures. The two phases of the outbreak were compared. RESULTS: Toronto Public Health investigated 2132 potential cases of SARS, identified 23,103 contacts of SARS patients as requiring quarantine, and logged 316,615 calls on its SARS hotline. In Toronto, 225 residents met the case definition of SARS, and all but 3 travel-related cases were linked to the index patient, from Hong Kong. SARS spread to 11 (58 percent) of Toronto's acute care hospitals. Unrecognized SARS among in-patients with underlying illness caused a resurgence, or a second phase, of the outbreak, which was finally controlled through active surveillance of hospitalized patients. In response to the control measures of Toronto Public Health, the number of persons who were exposed to SARS in nonhospital and nonhousehold settings dropped from 20 (13 percent) before the control measures were instituted (phase 1) to 0 afterward (phase 2). The number of patients who were exposed while in a hospital ward rose from 25 (17 percent) in phase 1 to 68 (88 percent) in phase 2, and the number exposed while in the intensive care unit dropped from 13 (9 percent) in phase 1 to 0 in phase 2. Community spread (the length of the chains of transmission outside of hospital settings) was significantly reduced in phase 2 of the outbreak (P<0.001). CONCLUSIONS: The transmission of SARS in Toronto was limited primarily to hospitals and to households that had had contact with patients. For every case of SARS, health authorities should expect to quarantine up to 100 contacts of the patients and to investigate 8 possible cases. During an outbreak, active in-hospital surveillance for SARS-like illnesses and heightened infection-control measures are essential.
机译:背景:多伦多是北美最大的严重急性呼吸系统综合症(SARS)爆发地点。了解与已采取的控制措施有关的传播方式及其对公共卫生的影响,将有助于卫生官员为将来的任何暴发做好准备。方法:我们分析了SARS病例,检疫和热线记录与控制措施的关系。比较了爆发的两个阶段。结果:多伦多公共卫生调查了2132例潜在的SARS病例,确定了23103名需要隔离的SARS患者联系人,并在其SARS热线记录了316,615个呼叫。在多伦多,有225名居民符合SARS的病例定义,除3个与旅行有关的病例外,其余病例均与来自香港的索引患者有关。 SARS蔓延至多伦多的11家急诊医院(58%)。患有基础疾病的住院病人中未被识别的SARS导致了疫情的复发或第二阶段的爆发,最终通过积极监测住院患者来控制。为响应多伦多公共卫生的控制措施,在非控制和非家庭环境中暴露于SARS的人数从采取控制措施之前(第一阶段)的20(13%)下降到此后的零(第二阶段)。在医院病房中暴露的患者人数从第一阶段的25(17%)上升到第二阶段的68(88%),而在重症监护病房中暴露的人数从2002年的13(9%)下降。从阶段1到阶段2的0。在阶段2的爆发中,社区传播(医院环境外的传播链长度)显着减少(P <0.001)。结论:SARS在多伦多的传播主要限于医院和与患者接触过的家庭。对于每一种SARS病例,卫生当局都应该隔离多达100位患者的接触者,并调查8种可能的病例。在暴发期间,必须对SARS样疾病进行积极的院内监测,并加强感染控制措施。

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