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The Effects of Platform Most-Favored-Nation Clauses on Competition and Entry

机译:平台最惠国条款对竞争和进入的影响

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摘要

In the context of sellers who sell their products through intermediary platforms, a platform most-favored-nation (PMFN) clause is a contractual restriction requiring that a particular seller will not sell at a lower price through a platform other than the one with which it has the PMFN agreement. Contractual restrictions observed in markets for e-books and travel services, among other settings, can be viewed as examples of this phenomenon. We show that PMFN clauses typically raise platform fees and retail prices and curtail entry or skew positioning decisions by potential entrants pursuing low-end business models.
机译:在通过中介平台出售产品的卖方的情况下,平台最惠国待遇(PMFN)条款是一项合同限制,要求特定卖方不得通过其平台以外的平台以较低的价格出售产品。拥有PMFN协议。在电子书和旅行服务市场中观察到的合同限制以及其他情况,可以看作是这种现象的例子。我们显示,PMFN条款通常会提高平台费用和零售价格,并通过追求低端业务模式的潜在进入者来减少进入或偏向的定位决策。

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