Wausau's top shareholder calls again for change: set $1 dividend, new name

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Wausau's top shareholder calls again for change: set $1 dividend, new name

机译：Wausau的大股东再次呼吁变革：设定1美元的股息，重新命名

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Wausau Paper's largest shareholder, Starboard Value, challenged the company this week to change its name, its headquarters location, and commit to a stock buyback and a consistently higher dividend payment. J

机译：Wausau Paper的最大股东Starboard Value在本周向公司提出挑战，要求更改公司名称，总部所在地，并承诺回购股票和支付更高的股息。 Ĵ

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《Pulp & Paper Week》 |2013年第41期|共1页
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1. Wausau's top shareholder calls again for change: set $1 dividend, new name [J] . Pulp amp, Paper Week GROUP Pulp & Paper Week . 2013,第41期

机译：Wausau的大股东再次呼吁变革：设定1美元的股息，重新命名
2. Starboard calls again for big changes at Wausau [J] . Pulp amp, Paper Week Group Pulp & Paper Week . 2014,第2期

机译：右舷再次呼吁沃索做出重大改变
3. Dividend Payouts and Shareholder Structure: Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange [J] . Aluchna Maria, Berent Tomasz, Kaminski Bogumil Eastern European Economics . 2019,第1a3期

机译：股利分配与股东结构：来自华沙证券交易所的证据
4. Distributed Consensus Algorithm For Multi-Missile Networks With Switching-Topologies And Dynamically-Changed Delay (Dcams) [C] . Ahmed Abdelmawgoud, Paul Hershey IEEE International Conference of System of Systems Engineering . 2020

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5. THE SHORT-TERM EFFECT ON SHAREHOLDER UTILITIES OF CHANGES IN CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY. [D] . HEATHCOTTE, JAMES BRYAN. 1970

机译：公司股息政策变更对股东持股利的短期影响。
6. Postoperative Positional and Dimensional Changes of Mandibular Canal after Bilateral Sagittal Split Set-Back Osteotomy [O] . Duygu İşcan, Melih Motro, Ahu Acar 2017

机译：双侧矢状劈开挫折截骨术后下颌管的位置和尺寸变化
7. Pyramidal groups, in Italy and elsewhere, represent a model of separation of ownership and control. Pyramids typically have blockholders which extract private benefits of control at the expenses of minority shareholder. This paper focuses on the Italian case where the number of pyramids is reducing but are still largely diffused. Groups are a form of entrenchment and may have negative effects on firm growth. They are characterized by conflicts of interest and self-dealing practices which reduced external financing opportunities. In this paper legal regulation of groups in Italy is discussed, which has positive aspects (art. 2497 ss. c.c.) but some weaknesses on self-dealing practices (artt. 2391 and 2391-bis c.c.). Future reforms should take into consideration the guidelines given at European level (for instance, by the High Level Group of Company Law Experts and the European Commission), which have been set aside from the political agendas of mostly European governments. Moreover, we suggest to strengthen the process of (not only formal) disclosure of relevant information to the company shareholders’ as well, in order not to dismantle pyramids, but to make them “shorter” (when that is the case), more transparent and reciprocally competitive. [O] . Giacomo Bosi, Sandro Trento 100

机译：在意大利和其他地方的金字塔群体代表了所有权和控制权分离的模式。金字塔通常拥有大股东，以小股东的利益为代价提取控制权的私人利益。本文重点关注意大利案例，其中金字塔的数量在减少，但仍然在很大程度上分散。群体是一种壕沟形式，可能对企业的成长产生负面影响。它们的特点是利益冲突和自我交易做法，减少了外部融资机会。在本文中，讨论了意大利群体的法律规定，它具有积极的方面（第2497条，c.c。），但在自我交易实践方面存在一些弱点（第2391条和第2391条之二）。未来的改革应该考虑到欧洲层面的指导方针（例如，公司法专家和欧洲委员会的高级别小组），这些指导方针已被搁置在主要是欧洲政府的政治议程之外。此外，我们建议加强（不仅正式）向公司股东披露相关信息的过程，以便不拆除金字塔，而是使它们“更短”（在这种情况下），更透明并且相互竞争。

Wausau's top shareholder calls again for change: set $1 dividend, new name

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