首页> 外文期刊>Working Paper Series. Monetary Economics >MONETARY POLICY, ASSET-PRICE BUBBLE AND THE ZERO LOWER BOUND
【24h】

MONETARY POLICY, ASSET-PRICE BUBBLE AND THE ZERO LOWER BOUND

机译:货币政策,资产价格泡沫和零下限

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
获取外文期刊封面目录资料

摘要

We use a simple model of a closed economy to study the recommendations of monetary policymakers, attempting to respond optimally to an asset-price bubble whose stochastic properties they understand. We focus on the impact which the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates has on the recommendations of such policy-makers. For a given target inflation rate, we identify several different forms of 'insurance' which policy-makers could potentially take out against encountering the ZLB due to the future bursting of a bubble. Even with perfect knowledge of the bubble process, however, which of these will be optimal varies from one type of bubble to another and, for certain bubbles, from one period to the next. It is therefore difficult to say whether the ZLB should cause policy-makers to operate policy more tightly or loosely than they would otherwise do, while a bubble is growing - even after abstracting from the informational difficulties they face in practice. We also examine the implications of the ZLB for policy-makers' preferences as to their inflation target. Policy-makers who wish to avoid concerns about the ZLB should take care not to set too low a target - especially if the neutral real interest rate is low.
机译:我们使用封闭经济的简单模型来研究货币政策制定者的建议,试图对他们理解其随机属性的资产价格泡沫做出最佳反应。我们重点关注名义利率的零下限(ZLB)对此类决策者的建议的影响。对于给定的目标通货膨胀率,我们确定了几种不同形式的“保险”,由于未来泡沫破裂,决策者有可能采取这种形式抵制遭遇零关税。但是,即使对气泡过程有完备的知识,从一种类型的气泡到另一种类型的气泡,对于某些类型的气泡,从一个时段到下一个时段,哪种效果最佳。因此,很难说出ZLB是否应该使决策者比以往任何时候都更严格或更宽松地执行政策,而泡沫正在不断增长-即使是从他们在实践中遇到的信息困难中抽象出来之后。我们还研究了ZLB对决策者的通胀目标偏好的影响。希望避免对ZLB感到担忧的政策制定者应注意不要将目标设定得太低-特别是在中性实际利率较低的情况下。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号