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Underpricing, wealth loss for pre-existing shareholders and the cost of going public: the role of private equity backing in Italian IPOs

机译:定价偏低,现有股东的财富损失和上市成本:私募股权支持在意大利IPO中的作用

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This study analyses the role of private equity investors in solving asymmetric information problems and the relationship to underpricing, wealth loss for pre-existing shareholders and the cost of going public. According to certification theory, companies backed by private equity investors are expected to have lower underpricing at the moment of an initial public offering, as they have fewer adverse selection problems, and there is less ex-ante uncertainty. However, the relationship between private equity backing and the cost of going public to issuers is less clear. We use a dataset of 66 private equity-backed and 94 non-private equity-backed companies that went public on the Milan Stock Exchange between January 1998 and June 2008. Our findings provide evidence that out of the PE-backed firms, only those backed by private equity syndication show lower initial-day returns and indirect issuance opportunity cost, while there is no difference in the certification role between bank-related and non bank-related private equity investors. We also find that the benefits persist for IPOs backed by private equity syndication, although to a lesser extent, even after adjusting for direct costs (gross spreads) the opportunity cost of issuance.View full textDownload full textKeywordsIPOs, underpricing, cost of going public, venture capital, private equityRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; var addthis_config = {"data_track_addressbar":true,"ui_click":true}; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13691066.2010.543321
机译:这项研究分析了私募股权投资人在解决信息不对称问题中的作用,以及与定价偏低,现有股东的财富损失和上市成本之间的关系。根据认证理论,由私人股本投资者支持的公司预计在首次公开募股时的定价偏低,因为逆向选择问题更少,事前不确定性也更少。但是,私募股权支持与发行人的上市成本之间的关系尚不清楚。我们使用了1998年1月至2008年6月之间在米兰证券交易所上市的66家私募股权支持公司和94家非私募股权支持公司的数据集。我们的发现提供了证据,表明在PE支持的公司中,只有那些支持的公司私人股本联合组织的数据显示,首日收益较低,间接发行机会成本较低,而与银行相关的私人股权投资者和与银行无关的私人股权投资者在认证角色方面没有差异。我们还发现,即使在调整直接成本(总价差)发行的机会成本之后,由私募股权联合组织支持的IPO仍然具有收益,尽管程度较小,甚至可以看到发行全文的机会。风险资本,私募股权相关变量var addthis_config = {ui_cobrand:“泰勒和弗朗西斯在线”,servicescompact:“ citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,更多”,发布:“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b “}; var addthis_config = {“ data_track_addressbar”:true,“ ui_click”:true};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13691066.2010.543321

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