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Urban consolidation, power relations, and dilapidated residential redevelopment in Mutoulong, Shenzhen, China

机译:深圳市木图隆的城市整合,权力关系和破旧的住宅开发

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摘要

Recent policy initiatives for urban development have changed the relationships among stakeholders in China's urban consolidation processes. Building upon Giddens' (Giddens A (1984) The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.) structuration theory and Ostrom's (Ostrom E (2005) Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) institutional analysis and development thesis, this paper develops a power arena analytic framework, and uses it to examine the new power relations among the stakeholders in a dilapidated residential redevelopment project in Shenzhen. Our findings reveal that Shenzhen's new approach incentivised the developer to frame a local decision-making structure which aligned the property owners into two broad groups: those who supported the developer, or cooperative, and those who disputed with the developer, or un-cooperative. Shenzhen's new attempt was unable to balance power distribution between the main stakeholders and caused intense conflicts and poor project outcomes. A range of factors, including passive participation of residents in project preparation, weak mechanisms to curb speculation, and policy inconsistency associated with tiers of governments, were responsible for the poor performance. These findings contribute to the understanding of the complexity in power relations underlying urban development influenced by planning policy.
机译:最近的城市发展政策举措已经改变了中国城市整合过程中利益相关者之间的关系。建立在吉登斯(Giddens A(1984)的《社会宪法:结构理论纲要》上。加利福尼亚州伯克利:加利福尼亚大学出版社。)结构化理论与奥斯特罗姆(Ostrom E(2005)对制度多样性的理解》,新泽西州普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社的机构分析和发展论文,建立了一个权力舞台分析框架,并用它来研究深圳一个破旧的住宅开发项目中利益相关者之间的新权力关系。我们的调查结果表明,深圳的新方法激励开发商制定本地决策结构,从而将业主分为两大类:支持开发商或合作社的人,与开发商争执或不合作的人。深圳的新尝试无法平衡主要利益相关者之间的权力分配,并导致了激烈的冲突和不良的项目成果。造成不良绩效的原因有很多,其中包括居民被动地参与项目准备,遏制投机活动的机制薄弱以及与政府各阶层相关的政策不一致。这些发现有助于理解受规划政策影响的城市发展背后的权力关系的复杂性。

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