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Hells Angels in springtime

机译:春天的地狱天使

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This article presents a case study of the criminal market activities surrounding the Quebec Hells Angels between 1997 and 2001. The popular and law-enforcement depiction of the Hells Angels, and most notably its Nomad chapter, follows the stereotypical image of traditional organized crime (e.g., monopoly control of the criminal market; a clear hierarchical organization; strict control of the organization’s members and associates). This general claim is tested in this article. The counter argument emphasizes that whereas the Hells Angels organization is a hierarchical structure with clear and explicit rules laid out for its members, there is no clear indication that this formal organziational structure is relevant when studying the criminal activities of members and associates. Quite differently, when it comes to participation in criminal markets, flexibility offers a better fit than the rigid confines of a formal organization. Data for the study was obtained from law-enforcement files that followed an important crackdown on the motorcycle club in Quebec during March 2001—this crackdown and the ensemble of investigations leading up to it have been commonly referred to as Operation Springtime. Through the use of electronic and physical surveilllance transcripts that recorded a high volume of communications between members and associates who were targeted by law-enforcement investigators over a five-year period, a representation of the criminal network surrounding the Hells Angels in their criminal market activities was constructed and analyzed. The main objective of the analyses was to assess the extent to which the Hells Angels hierarchy fits the criminal market activities that were targeted. The working hypotheses guiding these analyses follow that if Nomad members were indeed domineering criminal market participants, we would expect them to be relatively high in degree centrality (hands-on participants) and/or high in betweenness centrality (strategic brokers). Findings indicate that while the Nomads were, on average, higher in brokerage capital when compared with other members within the organization, Nomads were not the most central participants in the overall network. Instead, network participants who were highest in degree centrality were amongst the mid and lower-level members of the Hells Angels organization (suggesting a vulnerable/visible position), while those with the highest brokerage capital participants who held no biker or gang status (suggesting that the strengths of the network lay beyond the formal organization). In sum, the case study highlights the necessary nuances that are needed when approaching organized crime from a scholarly and policy outlook.
机译:本文提供了一个案例研究,分析了1997年至2001年之间魁北克地狱天使的犯罪市场活动。对地狱天使的流行和执法描绘,尤其是其游牧民族一章,遵循了传统有组织犯罪的刻板印象(例如,对犯罪市场的垄断控制,清晰的分层组织,对组织成员和准成员的严格控制)。此一般要求已在本文中进行了测试。相反的论点强调,尽管地狱天使组织是一个等级结构,为其成员制定了清晰明了的规则,但没有明确的迹象表明这种正式的组织结构在研究会员和同伙的犯罪活动时是相关的。完全不同的是,在参与犯罪市场时,灵活性要比正式组织的严格范围更好。这项研究的数据来自2001年3月对魁北克摩托车俱乐部的一次重大镇压之后的执法文件-这种镇压和导致其的调查集合通常被称为“春季行动”。通过使用电子和物理监视笔录,记录了执法调查人员在五年期间针对的成员和同伙之间的大量交流,从而代表了围绕地狱天使的犯罪网络在其犯罪市场活动中的表现。被构造和分析。分析的主要目的是评估地狱天使等级制度与目标犯罪市场活动的契合程度。指导这些分析的可行假设是,如果游牧民族的成员确实是犯罪市场参与者的主导者,我们希望他们的中心地位(动手参与者)和/或中间地位中心(战略经纪人)相对较高。调查结果表明,尽管与组织内的其他成员相比,游牧民族的经纪资本平均更高,但游牧民族并不是整个网络中最主要的参与者。取而代之的是,中心度最高的网络参与者属于地狱天使组织的中下层成员(建议处于弱势/可见位置),而经纪资本参与者最高的参与者则不具有骑车者或帮派身份(建议)。网络的优势不在于正式组织)。总而言之,该案例研究从学术和政策角度突出了处理有组织犯罪时所需的必要细微差别。

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