Replies to Mercier and Oaksford

摘要

I reply to Hugo Mercier's and Mike Oaksford's comments on my pragmatist criticisms of the argumentative theory of reasoning (ATR). In replying to Mercier, I repeat my initial criticisms that the ATR sees too small a role for individual reasoning and that it fails where "framework" beliefs are involved. I use US Supreme Court opinions as an example of the latter problem. I also note that the ATR's dichotomy of argument production and argument evaluation seems to break down, and suggest that the dichotomy may be based on the faulty assumption that an argument's validity depends solely on its form. Finally, I note that it may be possible for the ATR to accommodate pragmatist criticisms with minimal changes. I generally agree with Oaksford's comments, but take exception to a comment by Ulrike Hahn and Oaksford that rational agents should eventually agree on what constitutes a fallacious argument.