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Special Committee Process Not Effective and Over $2 Billion Awarded for Controlling Stockholder's Breach of Fiduciary Duty

机译:特别委员会程序无效,因控制股东违反信托义务而获得超过20亿美元的奖励

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摘要

The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault confirmed that the entire fairness standard of review will apply ab initio and remain the standard of judicial review throughout the course of litigation if a controlling stockholder stands on both sides of a transaction. While defendants can obtain a shift of the burden of persuasion on the issue of entire fairness by showing that the transaction was negotiated and approved by a well-functioning committee of disinterested and independent directors, the burden shifting determination must be made before trial, if possible. The burden of persuasion will remain with defendants if a pre-trial burden shifting determination is not feasible.
机译:特拉华州最高法院在Americas Mining Corp.诉Theriault案中的裁决确认,如果控股股东站​​在交易的两边,则整个公正性审查标准将从头开始适用,并且在整个诉讼过程中仍然是司法审查的标准。虽然被告可以通过证明交易是由运作良好的无私和独立董事委员会进行谈判和批准而在整个公平问题上转移说服负担,但如果可能的话,必须在审判前做出转移负担的决定。 。如果审判前的负担转移决定不可行,则被告将继续承担说服的负担。

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    《The Business Lawyer》 |2013年第2期|538-541|共4页
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