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A fresh look at zero-rating

机译:零利率焕然一新

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We provide an economic assessment of zero-rating offers in the context of mobile internet access services and draw six lessons: (1) Zero-rating can have several different characteristics that crucially affect their economic and welfare assessment. Thus, regulatory interventions must be based on a careful case-by-case analysis. (2) In the context of zero-rating offers, it is often crucial to evaluate the extent to which users are able to activate and deactivate a (throttled) zero-rated tariff option. If activation/deactivation is easy and instantaneous, a sound economic theory of harm for consumers will in many cases be hard to establish. (3) Similarly, if access to zero-rated partner programs is non-discriminatory and entails low barriers to entry, a sound theory of harm for content providers will usually not be given. (4) Zero-rating can be beneficial for consumers and (legal) content providers alike by contributing to a reduction of illegal content. Combined with throttling it can mitigate congestion problems. However, by requiring all content belonging to the same content category to be treated equally with respect to throttling, independent of whether a content provider opted for zero-rating or not, the existing regulation creates a negative externality on those content providers that do not wish to be zero-rated for some reason. (5) Particular attention should be paid to the impact of throttled zero-rating tariffs on the competition between mobile network operators (MNOs) and MVNOs. The latter may not be able to compete on equal footing with MNOs, because they benefit less from the traffic management aspects of zero-rating. (6) Competition among (infrastructure-based) ISPs provides a safeguard against severe rent extraction and, thus, an abuse of throttling and zero-rating as an exploitative device. Therefore, regulators should carefully account for the competitive environment and the existing tariff portfolio and options before deciding to intervene. Competition policy, rather than ex-ante regulation, may be more suitable for this task.
机译:我们在移动互联网访问服务的背景下提供了对零利率优惠的经济评估,并得出了六个教训:(1)零利率可能具有几个不同的特征,这些特征会严重影响其经济和福利评估。因此,监管干预措施必须基于认真的个案分析。 (2)在零费率报价的背景下,评估用户能够激活和停用(节流的)零费率关税选项的程度通常至关重要。如果激活/停用很容易且立即进行,那么在许多情况下将很难建立起对消费者有害的经济经济学理论。 (3)同样,如果零利率合作伙伴计划的访问是非歧视性的,并且进入门槛较低,则通常不会提供对内容提供商有害的合理理论。 (4)零税率有助于减少非法内容,从而对消费者和(合法)内容提供商均有利。结合节流可以缓解拥塞问题。但是,通过要求将属于同一内容类别的所有内容在节流方面进行同等对待,而与内容提供者是否选择零税率无关,现有法规对那些不希望出现的内容提供者产生负面外部影响由于某种原因而被归零。 (5)应特别注意节流零关税对移动网络运营商(MNO)与MVNO之间竞争的影响。后者可能无法与MNO平等竞争,因为它们从零费率的流量管理方面受益较少。 (6)(基于基础结构的)ISP之间的竞争为防止严重的租金提取提供了一种保护措施,从而避免了节流和零利率的滥用。因此,在决定干预之前,监管机构应仔细考虑竞争环境以及现有的关税组合和选择。竞争政策而非事前监管可能更适合此任务。

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