The cognition dimension of theory change in Kuhn's philosophy of science

摘要

A number of philosophers have recently sought to assess Kuhn's contribution to philosophy of science. There is no consensus yet. Even amongst those whose assessment of Kuhn's work is largely negative, there is disagreement about where things went wrong. For example, Steve Fuller (2000) suggests that Kuhn's lasting impact has been to weaken our ability to criticize science. According to Kuhn, scientists work in self policing research communities, investigating esoteric problems that the public is in no position to understand. Alexander Bird (2000) attributes the failure of Kuhn's project to his inability to transcend positivism and its mistakes. Though often regarded as reacting against positivism, Kuhn and the positivists share 'a concern about our access to reality', a concern that Bird believes is ungrounded (ibid. p. 237). Michael Friedman (2001) suggests that Kuhn's legacy is not any of the substantive claims for which he is famous, but a problem, the problem of theory change. Friedman, though, argues that Kuhn's own solution to the problem is ultimately inadequate.