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Standing out from the crowd: Dedicated institutional investors and strategy uniqueness

机译:从人群中脱颖而出:专门的机构投资者和战略唯一性

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Research summary This article examines the effect of dedicated institutional investors on firms' strategy uniqueness. We build on the uniqueness paradox where unique strategies are important drivers of economic rent, yet create an information problem whereby CEOs face discounts from the capital market, thus discouraging them from selecting unique strategies. We propose dedicated institutional investors as a partial remedy to the uniqueness paradox. Dedicated institutional investors invest in gaining private information about their investments, devote effort to understanding firms' strategies, and reduce capital market pressure. Thus, dedicated institutional investors can encourage CEOs to pursue more unique strategies. Our empirical results show the positive influence of dedicated institutional investors on strategic uniqueness, which is even stronger when firms operate in industries that are hard to value.Managerial summary Unique strategies can be an important way for managers to create long-term value. However, some managers shy away from implementing such strategies, fearing that the short-term oriented capital market does not fully understand the long-term benefits of unique strategies and hence punishes them. Our study shows that investors who are long-term-oriented, focused, and committed help resolve this issue. These owners gather in-depth private information about their investments, devote effort to understanding firms' strategies, and reduce capital market pressures. Hence, their commitment and patience can encourage CEOs to pursue more unique strategies. Our study reflects the high levels of responsibility that investors have on strategic decision-making. Therefore, we recommend to intensify the communication between investors and firms on strategic topics (e.g., in form of stewardship policies).
机译:研究总结本文探讨了专门的机构投资者对公司战略唯一性的影响。我们建立在独特性悖论之上,其中独特的策略是经济租金的重要驱动因素,却创造了一个信息问题,从而从资本市场折扣折扣,从而劝阻他们选择独特的策略。我们提出专门的机构投资者作为唯一性悖论的部分补救措施。专门的机构投资者投资于获取有关其投资的私人信息,致力于了解公司的战略,并降低资本市场压力。因此,专门的机构投资者可以鼓励首席执行官追求更独特的战略。我们的经验结果表明,专门的机构投资者对战略唯一性的积极影响,当企业在难以减价的行业中运作时,甚至更强大。管理者总结独特战略可以成为管理人员创造长期价值的重要途径。然而,一些管理人员害羞地远离实施此类策略,担心短期导向的资本市场并没有完全理解独特战略的长期利益,因此惩罚它们。我们的研究表明,长期导向,专注和致力的投资者解决了这个问题。这些业主聚集有关其投资的深入私人信息,致力于了解公司的策略,减少资本市场压力。因此,他们的承诺和耐心可以鼓励首席执行官追求更独特的策略。我们的研究反映了投资者对战略决策的高度责任。因此,我们建议加强投资者与战略主题之间的沟通(例如,以管理政策的形式)。

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