首页> 外文期刊>Strategic Management Journal >Why resource-based theory's model of profit appropriation must incorporate a stakeholder perspective
【24h】

Why resource-based theory's model of profit appropriation must incorporate a stakeholder perspective

机译:为什么基于资源的理论的利润分配模型必须包含利益相关者的观点

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       

摘要

Research Summary: Using arguments derived from transactions cost economics and incomplete contract theory, this article shows that the assumption that shareholders are a firm's only residual claimants is logically inconsistent with resource-based theory's model of profit generation. It follows from this conclusion that resource-based theory's model of profit appropriation must incorporate a stakeholder perspective. Some theoretical and empirical implications of this conclusion for resource-based theory's model of profit generation, profit appropriation, the role of managers and entrepreneurs in resource-based theory, and how conflicting interests among stakeholders can be resolved are all discussed. Finally, some continuing differences between stakeholder theory and incorporating a stakeholder perspective into resource-based theory's model of profit appropriation are also discussed. Managerial Summary: Some argue that since shareholders are the only stakeholder who have a claim on a firm's profits, managers should focus only on maximizing shareholder wealth. Not only will this satisfy shareholders, it will also satisfy a firm's other stakeholders, since-in principle-these other stakeholders get paid before shareholders. This article shows that this logic is deeply flawed. In particular, it shows that if the only stakeholder who has a claim on a firm's economic profits is shareholders, then-in most competitive settings-a firm will not be able to attract the kinds of resources it needs to generate these profits. To attract the kinds of resources that can generate profits, managers must recognize that stakeholders, besides shareholders, have claims on the profits that their resources help generate. This, in turn, suggests that managers seeking to generate economic profits must adopt a stakeholder perspective in how they manage their firm. This article explores the managerial implications of this conclusion.
机译:研究摘要:本文使用交易成本经济学和不完整合同理论得出的论点表明,假设股东是企业唯一的剩余索偿人这一假设在逻辑上与基于资源的理论的利润产生模型不一致。由此得出的结论是,基于资源的理论的利润分配模型必须纳入利益相关者的观点。讨论了该结论对基于资源的理论的利润产生模型,利润分配,经理和企业家在基于资源的理论中的作用以及如何解决利益相关者之间的利益冲突的一些理论和经验意义。最后,还讨论了利益相关者理论与将利益相关者观点纳入基于资源的理论的利润分配模型之间的一些持续差异。管理摘要:有些人认为,由于股东是唯一对公司利润有要求的利益相关者,因此管理人员应只专注于最大化股东财富。这不仅会使股东满意,也将使公司的其他利益相关者满意,因为从原则上讲,这些其他利益相关者在股东之前获得报酬。本文显示此逻辑存在严重缺陷。特别是,它表明,如果对公司的经济利益有要求的唯一利益相关者是股东,那么在大多数竞争环境中,公司将无法吸引其产生这些利润所需的各种资源。为了吸引各种可以产生利润的资源,管理者必须认识到,除了股东以外,利益相关者还对他们的资源所产生的利润提出了要求。反过来,这表明寻求产生经济利润的管理者在管理公司时必须采取利益相关者的观点。本文探讨了该结论的管理意义。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号