The Great Powers And The Sub-continent: A New Phase?

摘要

The emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign independent republic and the manner in which it so emerged has radically altered the relative position of the Great Powers in South Asia. The change has been particularly remarkable for the two Super Powers, though the other three Great Powers also have been affected in one way or the other by the developments of 1971.rnIt is obvious that the Super Power which has gained immeasurably in both prestige and influence due to the events of last year is the Soviet Union. Russian policy towards the subcontinent had undergone many changes over the years. An early indifference to India and Pakistan yielded place to a strong pro-India policy in the mid-1950s and before the decade was over the Soviet Union had emerged in most Indian eyes as the country's greatest friend. In the post-Khrushchev period, however, there were great anxieties in India about the twists and turns in Soviet policy and when it became known in the late 1960s that the Soviet Union was extending military assistance to Pakistan, India was greatly disturbed. Even before Tashkent, the Soviet Union had shown some interest in pursuing a policy of equal friendliness to India and Pakistan which was a distinct change from the earlier Soviet posture of full support to India in all Indo-Pakistani disputes. After Tashkent, the Soviet Union saw itself as the peace-maker in the sub-continent and this necessitated a posture that caused some anxiety in India. It had got used to Soviet support and sympathy and any indication of Soviet neutrality created concern in New Delhi. Similarly, in regard to the Sino-Indian problems, the Soviet position has not always been welcome in New Delhi. Yet, notwithstanding these fluctuations in Soviet attitude and the zig-zag nature of the course it pursued, there was throughout a broad assumption underlying Soviet policies towards South Asia, that India was the key factor in the region and that any policy which created distrust and dissension between the two countries was to be avoided. Therefore, in substance, Soviet policy remained pro-Indian both in regard to the problems of Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian relations. Any Soviet role of either mediation or peace-making in the region was to be consistent with what India would at any point of time regard as its vital national interests.