首页> 外文期刊>Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal >Chiefs as Critical Partners for Decentralized Governance of Fisheries: An Analysis of Co-Management Case Studies in Malawi
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Chiefs as Critical Partners for Decentralized Governance of Fisheries: An Analysis of Co-Management Case Studies in Malawi

机译:酋长作为渔业权力下放治理的重要伙伴:马拉维共同管理案例研究的分析

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Centralized regulation and fisheries co-management institutions, when imposed on Malawian fisherfolk, have failed due to poor local legitimacy, resulting in de facto open access regimes for most Malawian fisheries. Case studies from a range of locations indicate that a key to success or failure in co-management lies in understanding the roles played by both traditional (chiefs) and representational (stakeholder) institutions. Formally instituted, conservation-driven co-management institutions are unlikely to be effective if they try to replace informally derived, consensus-based social and cultural institutions. Additionally, institutional legitimacy requires downward accountability, and both traditional and decentralized institutions must remain vigilant against the threat of elite capture. An analysis of fisherfolk and chieftain roles in Malawi's fisheries management regimes illustrates how these stakeholders may either promote or undermine socially and ecologically sustainable outcomes. We conclude that both decentralized representational institutions and a??institutional bricolagea?? facilitated by chiefs are critical to maintaining resilient co-management institutions and fishing livelihoods.View full textDownload full textKeywordsCBNRM, chiefs, co-management, colonialism, elite capture, institutional bricolage , Lake Malawi, leadership legitimacy, sustainable fisheries, traditional authorityRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2010.501432
机译:对马拉维渔民实行的集中管理和渔业共同管理机构由于地方合法性差而失败,从而导致大多数马拉维渔业事实上实行了开放准入制度。来自不同地点的案例研究表明,共同管理成功或失败的关键在于理解传统(首席)和代表(利益相关者)机构所扮演的角色。如果正式建立的,以保护为驱动力的共同管理机构试图取代非正式衍生的,基于共识的社会和文化机构,则不太可能奏效。此外,机构的合法性需要向下问责制,传统机构和分散机构都必须保持警惕,以免遭到精英占领的威胁。对渔民和酋长在马拉维渔业管理制度中的作用的分析表明,这些利益相关者如何促进或破坏社会和生态可持续的成果。我们得出的结论是,权力下放的代表机构和“机构的bricoragea”?由酋长提供的便利对于维持有弹性的共同管理机构和捕鱼生计至关重要。查看全文下载全文关键词CBNRM,酋长,共同管理,殖民主义,精英捕获,机构贿赂,马拉维湖,领导合法性,可持续渔业,传统权威相关var addthis_config = {ui_cobrand:“ Taylor&Francis Online”,servicescompact:“ citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,更多”,发布:“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2010.501432

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