Room assignment-rent division: A market approach

摘要

A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.We would like to thank seminar participants at Barcelona, Boston College, Duke, Koç, Málaga, MIT, Michigan, NYU, conference participants at the First Brazilian Workshop of Game Theory Society (Sao Paulo 2002), SED 2002-Conference on Economic Design (New York City 2002), The Sixth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (Pasadena 2002), an anonymous referee for their comments and Ahmet Alkan, Selçuk Karabati, Bari Tan, nsan Tunali for insightful discussions. Sönmez gratefully acknowledges the research support of KoçBank via the KoçBank scholar program and Turkish Academy of Sciences in the framework of the Young Scientist Award Program via grant TS/TÜBA-GEBP/2002-1-19. Any errors are our own responsibility.