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Long-Term Consequences of Aggressive Diplomacy: European Relations after Austrian Crimean War Threats

机译:侵略性外交的长期后果:奥地利克里米亚战争威胁后的欧洲关系

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摘要

There is a large literature on the impacts of explicit threats on the outcomes of crises between states, but the longer-term impacts of threats on dyadic state relationships and on international outcomes have been much less studied because of the difficulty of establishing causal connections between events separated in time. By comparing nearly identical foreign policy contexts before and after the Austrian Crimean War ultimata to Russia, this article demonstrates that, contrary to the prevailing view in much of the international relations literature, such long-term effects are not marginal ones that theoretical simplification with the goal of analyzing the central tendencies of the international system can usefully ignore. Under conditions discussed below, when a state is threatened in a way that attempts to deny one of its key policy objectives, that state will be less likely to come to the aid of the threatening state in the future and more likely to join the other side in future wars, realign its alliance commitments, and adopt strategies to drain the resources of the threatening state. Among the implications of these findings are that policymakers should take greater account of the long-term consequences of aggressive negotiating stances than current theories imply and that scholars have underestimated the information conveyed by private threats in crisis bargaining.
机译:关于外在威胁对国家间危机后果的影响有大量文献,但是由于难以在事件之间建立因果关系,因此对威胁对二元国家关系和国际结果的长期影响的研究较少。在时间上分开。通过比较奥地利克里米亚战争最后通to前后与俄罗斯几乎相同的外交政策背景,本文证明,与许多国际关系文献中的普遍观点相反,这种长期影响并非是边际影响,因此理论上简化了这种影响。分析国际体系中心趋势的目标可以忽略不计。在以下讨论的条件下,当一个国家受到威胁而试图否认其主要政策目标之一时,该国家将来将不太可能获得该威胁国家的援助,而更有可能加入另一方在未来的战争中,重新调整其联盟承诺,并采取战略来耗尽威胁国的资源。这些发现的含义是,决策者应比现行理论所暗示的更多地考虑到积极谈判立场的长期后果,而且学者们低估了私人威胁在危机谈判中传达的信息。

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  • 来源
    《Security studies》 |2012年第2期|p.232-265|共34页
  • 作者

    ROBERT F. TRAGER;

  • 作者单位

    Political science department at the University of California, Los Angeles;

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  • 正文语种 eng
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