Painless Deprivation

摘要

In their perspective ("pains and pleas-ures of social life," 13 February, p. 890), M. D. Lieberman and N. I. Eisenberger argue that for every type of deprivation, there is an associated pain, and that the more deprived one is, the more pleasurable fulfilling the need will be. This harkens back to need-reduction theo-rnries of reinforcement, along the lines of Hull (1). However, there are numerous counterexamples [as Mazur (2) points out].rnFor example, rats need thiamine, but despite the fact that foods containing the nutrient would constitute "the salve that will take the pain away and satisfy the underlying need," rats cannot detect thiamine in food, and so do not seek it out. Similarly, humans need oxygen, but carbon monoxide poisoning does not generate a pain. People instead fall asleep and die.rnIt is unclear whether a distinction between wants and needs (as the argument is sometimes framed) has implications for the basic argument made by Lieberman and Eisenberger regarding the representation of pleasure and pain in the brain, but it is certainly a distinction that should not be ignored.