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Microprudential Regulation in a Dynamic Model of Banking

机译:银行动态模型中的微观审慎监管

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This paper studies the quantitative impact of microprudential bank regulations on bank lending and value metrics of efficiency and welfare in a dynamic model of banks that are financed by debt and equity, undertake maturity transformation, are exposed to credit and liquidity risks, and face financing frictions. We show that (1) there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between bank lending, welfare, and capital requirements, (2) liquidity requirements unambiguously reduce lending, efficiency, and welfare, and (3) resolution policies contingent on observed capital, such as prompt corrective action, dominate in efficiency and welfare terms (noncontingent) capital and liquidity requirements.
机译:本文在一个由债务和股权融资,进行期限转换,面临信贷和流动性风险并面临融资摩擦的动态模型中,研究了微观审慎的银行法规对银行贷款的定量影响以及效率和福利的价值指标。 。我们证明(1)银行贷款,福利和资本要求之间存在倒U型关系,(2)流动性要求明确减少了贷款,效率和福利,(3)取决于观察到的资本的解决政策,例如作为迅速的纠正措施,在效率和福利方面(非临时性)的资本和流动性要求占主导地位。

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