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Out-of-Court Restructuring versus Formal Bankruptcy in a Non-Interventionist Bankruptcy Setting*

机译:在非干预性破产背景下进行庭外重组与正式破产*

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摘要

We investigate debt restructurings in Germany for a sample of 116 financially distressed companies. About half of the firms succeed in restructuring their debt in a workout while the others file for bankruptcy. Our evidence suggests that firms which have higher leverage, owe more debt to banks, and exhibit higher going concern values are more likely to conduct a workout. Bankruptcy is more likely for firms with deficient lender coordination and a high fraction of collateralized debt. An analysis of stock returns suggests that the market uses similar information to predict workouts. 84% of the bankrupt firms were ultimately liquidated.
机译:我们调查了德国116家陷入财务困境的公司的债务重组。大约一半的公司在一次债务重组中成功地重组了债务,而其他公司则申请破产。我们的证据表明,杠杆率更高,欠银行的债务更多且持续经营价值更高的公司更有可能进行试点。对于贷方协调不足且抵押债务比例很高的公司,破产的可能性更大。对股票收益的分析表明,市场使用类似的信息来预测锻炼。最终有84%的破产公司被清算。

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  • 来源
    《Review of Finance》 |2010年第4期|p.623-668|共46页
  • 作者

    Philipp Jostarndt;

  • 作者单位

    University of Munich and The Boston Consulting Group, Germany;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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