首页> 外文期刊>Review of Economics and Statistics >CAN QUOTAS INCREASE THE SUPPLY OF CANDIDATES FOR HIGHER-LEVEL POSITIONS? EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN INDIA
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CAN QUOTAS INCREASE THE SUPPLY OF CANDIDATES FOR HIGHER-LEVEL POSITIONS? EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN INDIA

机译:配额可以增加高级别职位的候选人供应吗?来自印度当地政府的证据

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摘要

A one-third quota rule for women in local political leadership seats in India increases the number of female candidates who later contest seats in state and national legislatures. This arises from the candidacy of beneficiaries who gained political experience due to the quotas and career politicians who continue contesting in longer-exposed areas. The policy accounts for a substantial portion of the increase in female candidates for high office since the mid-1990s. Women have a higher probability of a top finish when running on major party tickets or contesting in areas that overlap with their local constituency.
机译:对印度担任地方政治领导职位的女性实行三分之一的配额规定,增加了后来在州和国家立法机构中竞选席位的女性候选人的数量。这源于受益者的候选人资格,这些受益者是由于配额问题而获得政治经验的人和职业政治家继续在曝光时间较长的地区竞争。自1990年代中期以来,该政策在担任高级职务的女性候选人增加中占了很大一部分。当参加大型派对或在与当地选区重叠的地区进行比赛时,女性获得最高成绩的可能性更高。

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