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TRADE CREDIT OR VERTICAL MERGER STRATEGY FOR FINANCIAL CONSTRAINED RETAILER IN A SUPPLY CHAIN WITH ASYMMETRIC COMPETING RETAILERS

机译:在供应链中的财务约束零售商的贸易信贷或垂直合并策略与不对称的竞争零售商

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Motivated by the practices that many small and middle-sized enterprises (SME) retailers have financial constraints due to their limited budget and financing access, this paper studies the manufacturer's financial strategy (i.e., trade credit versus vertical merger with a capital-constrained retailer) in a supply chain with two financial asymmetric retailers. We first compare the equilibrium profits under different financing modes and find that if manufacturer's capital cost under trade credit or administrative cost under vertical merger is below a certain threshold, the manufacturer should finance instead of deselect the capital-constrained retailer even though the competition is intensified. Furthermore, manufacturer can choose a financing strategy based on the tradeoff between financing value and cost from trade credit or vertical merger. Under trade credit, the increased horizontal competition intensity is against the capital-constrained retailer while with vertical merger the competition intensity is harmful to the capital-abundant retailer. In addition, through investigating the impact of different financial modes on the equilibrium profits of the supply chain players, we find that whether trade credit can outperform vertical merger for both the manufacturer and the capital-constrained retailer depends on horizontal competition intensity, profit-sharing proportion and administrative cost of vertical merger. Moreover, the capital-abundant retailer will get the lowest profit when other participators act like an alliance. Our study provides a roadmap for the manufacturer to make a financing policy for capital-constrained retailer who competes with a funded retailer.
机译:本文研究了许多小型和中型企业(中小企业)零售商的零售商有资金限制,零售商有资金限制,本文研究了制造商的财务策略(即贸易信贷与资本限制零售商的贸易信贷。在一个供应链中,有两个金融不对称零售商。我们首先比较不同融资模式下的均衡利润,发现,如果制造商根据贸易信贷或行政费用下的贸易信贷或行政费用低于一定的门槛,因此制造商应该为竞争加剧,而不是取消选择资本限制零售商。此外,制造商可以根据贸易信用卡或垂直合并的筹资价值和成本之间的权衡选择融资策略。根据贸易信贷,水平竞争强度增加是对资本限制零售商的,而垂直合并竞争强度对资本丰富的零售商有害。此外,通过调查不同金融模式对供应链玩家的均衡利润的影响,我们发现贸易信贷是否能够以制造商和资本限制零售商的垂直合并,取决于水平竞争强度,利润分享垂直合并的比例和行政费用。此外,资本丰富的零售商将获得最低利润,当其他参与者就像联盟一样。我们的研究为制造商提供了一种路线图,为与资助零售商竞争的资本限制零售商提供融资政策。

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