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OPTIMAL PRODUCT QUALITY AND PRICING STRATEGY FOR A TWO-PERIOD CLOSED-LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN WITH RETAILER VARIABLE MARKUP

机译:带有零售商变量的两周期闭环供应链的最优产品质量和定价策略

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In this paper, we consider a two-period closed-loop supply chain which is comprised of a single manufacturer and a single retailer for trading a single product. At the retailer, the demand in the first period depends on the selling price, product quality and refund price, whereas in the second period, it depends on the selling price and the product quality. The retailer sets the selling prices with variable markups on the wholesale prices of the manufacturer and offers a return policy (immediate return and used product return) limited to the first period only. The immediate return is dependent on the refund price and the product quality, and the amount of returned used items is a fraction of the first period's demand. The retailer sends the returned items to the manufacturer who reproduces/repairs those items and sells in the second period. We assume that the manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader and the retailer as the follower. We study the impacts of return policy, product quality and pricing strategy on the optimal decisions under two decision strategies (I and II). In the decision strategy I, both the players optimize their total profits over the entire selling season, whereas in the decision strategy II, they optimize each period's profit sequentially. With the help of a numerical example we explore that the decision strategy I gives better result than the decision strategy II in terms of all decision variables except the product quality. We also investigate the effects of key model-parameters on the optimal decisions.
机译:在本文中,我们考虑了一个由两个制造商和一个零售商组成的两周期闭环供应链,用于交易一种产品。在零售商处,第一阶段的需求取决于售价,产品质量和退款价格,而在第二阶段,其需求取决于售价和产品质量。零售商在制造商的批发价上为可变价格设置销售价格,并提供仅限于第一时期的退货政策(立即退货和使用过的产品退货)。立即退货取决于退款价格和产品质量,退回的使用过的物品数量仅是第一期需求的一小部分。零售商将退回的物品发送给制造商,制造商在第二期间复制/修理这些物品并进行销售。我们假设制造商充当Stackelberg的领导者,零售商充当追随者。我们研究了两种决策策略(I和II)下的退货政策,产品质量和定价策略对最优决策的影响。在决策策略I中,两个参与者都优化了整个销售季节的总利润,而在决策策略II中,他们依次优化了每个时期的利润。借助一个数字示例,我们发现在除产品质量以外的所有决策变量方面,决策策略I的结果要优于决策策略II。我们还研究了关键模型参数对最佳决策的影响。

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