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Government Subsidy Strategies for Biosimilars R&D Based on Dynamic Game Theory

机译:基于动态博弈论的生物仿制性研发的政府补助策略

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In order to develop the biomedical industry, government subsidy of biosimilars is an incentive policy which has been used by the government. Different government subsidy strategies have an impact on drug price, consumer surplus, social welfare, the income of biosimilars enterprises and the demand of biosimilars, which have been deeply analyzed through backward induction of the dynamic game theory. The analysis shows that the price coefficient and the influence of the subsidy on demand will affect the choice of government subsidy strategies. It is concluded that under different subsidy strategies, consumer surplus, social welfare and the income of biosimilars enterprises are positively correlated with the amount of subsidy per unit product. This paper provides a decision-making basis for developing government subsidy strategies scientifically.
机译:为了发展生物医学行业,政府补贴生物仿制物是政府使用的激励政策。不同的政府补贴战略对药品价格,消费盈余,社会福利,生物仿制剂企业的收入和生物仿制性的需求产生了影响,这通过落后的动态博弈论深入分析。分析表明,价格系数和补贴对需求的影响将影响政府补贴策略的选择。结论是,根据不同的补贴战略,消费者盈余,社会福利和生物仿制物企业的收入与每单位产品的补贴金额正相关。本文为科学制定政府补贴策略提供了决策基础。

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