Determination of Nash Equilibrium Based on Plausible Attack-Defense Dynamics

摘要

In the critical infrastructure domain, there exist two distinct players, i.e., attackers and defenders, with contradictory strategies to achieve their winnings. This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to capture the plausible attack-defense dynamics for power transmission grids in a controlled environment. The stratagems of attackers and defenders can be modeled with unique attributes of their motives and emergency responses. The behaviors of attackers include observation and disruptive actions that can disturb operation while defenders can establish multiple levels of defense with remedial actions for risk mitigation. With an assumption of complete information, the defenders can minimize expected loss of load and generator tripping with load generation adjustment based on current conditions. The attackers, which represent the other force, can maximize their payoff by deploying persistent agents to target on the specific points within a power operation network. The boundary between these two, referred as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, is proposed in the dynamic game model. This model initiates an original infinite game tree that is converted into a finite structure, which is solved using a backward induction approach with multiple scenario validations.