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A particular upper expectation as global belief model for discrete-time finite-state uncertain processes

机译:作为离散时间有限状态不确定过程的全球信仰模型的特定上述期望

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To model discrete-time finite-state uncertain processes, we argue for the use of a global belief model in the form of an upper expectation that is the most conservative one under a set of basic axioms. Our motivation for these axioms, which describe how local and global belief models should be related, is based on two possible interpretations for an upper expectation: a behavioural one similar to Walley's, and an interpretation in terms of upper envelopes of linear expectations. We show that the most conservative upper expectation satisfying our axioms, that is, our model of choice, coincides with a particular version of the game-theoretic upper expectation introduced by Shafer and Vovk. This has two important implications: it guarantees that there is a unique most conservative global belief model satisfying our axioms; and it shows that Shafer and Vovk's model can be given an axiomatic characterisation and thereby provides an alternative motivation for adopting this model, even outside their game-theoretic framework. Finally, we relate our model to the upper expectation resulting from a traditional measure-theoretic approach. We show that this measure-theoretic upper expectation also satisfies the proposed axioms, which implies that it is dominated by our model or, equivalently, the game-theoretic model. Moreover, if all local models are precise, all three models coincide. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机译:为了模拟离散时间有限状态不确定的过程,我们认为在上期望是一组基本公理按照最保守的一个形式使用一个全球性的信仰模式。我们对这些公理,它描述了本地和全球的信仰模式应如何与动机,是基于上预期两种可能的解释:行为一个类似沃利的,而在直线预期上信封方面的解释。我们发现,最保守的预期上满足我们的公理,那就是我们选择的模型,恰逢由谢弗和沃夫克介绍了博弈论上期望的特定版本。这有两个重要的意义:它保证不存在满足我们的公理的唯一最保守的全球信念模式;它表明,谢弗和沃夫克的模型可以给出一个不言自明的特征,从而提供了另一种动机采用这种模式,甚至超出其博弈论框架。最后,我们与我们的模型从传统的测量理论方法导致上期望。我们表明,这种措施论的预期上也满足所提的公理,这意味着它是由我们的模型或等效的博弈论模型为主。此外,如果所有的本地模型精确,所有三个型号一致。 (c)2020 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。

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