Controlling collective dynamics in complex minority-game resource-allocation systems

摘要

Resource allocation takes place in various kinds of real-world complex systems, such as traffic systems,nsocial services institutions or organizations, or even ecosystems. The fundamental principle underlying complexnresource-allocation dynamics is Boolean interactions associated with minority games, as resources are generallynlimited and agents tend to choose the least used resource based on available information. A common but harmfulndynamical behavior in resource-allocation systems is herding, where there are time intervals during which anlarge majority of the agents compete for a few resources, leaving many other resources unused. Accompanyingnthe herd behavior is thus strong fluctuations with time in the number of resources being used. In this paper, wenarticulate and establish that an intuitive control strategy, namely pinning control, is effective at harnessing thenherding dynamics. In particular, by fixing the choices of resources for a few agents while leaving the majoritynof the agents free, herding can be eliminated completely. Our investigation is systematic in that we considernrandom and targeted pinning and a variety of network topologies, and we carry out a comprehensive analysisnin the framework of mean-field theory to understand the working of control. The basic philosophy is then that,nwhen a few agents waive their freedom to choose resources by receiving sufficient incentives, the majority ofnthe agents benefit in that they will make fair, efficient, and effective use of the available resources. Our worknrepresents a basic and general framework to address the fundamental issue of fluctuations in complex dynamicalnsystems with significant applications to social, economical, and political systems.