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Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership

机译:建立精神所有权的解释性框架

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Philosophical and scientific investigations of the proprietary aspects of self—mineness or mental ownership—often presuppose that searching for unique constituents is a productive strategy. But there seem not to be any unique constituents. Here, it is argued that the “self-specificity” paradigm, which emphasizes subjective perspective, fails. Previously, it was argued that mode of access also fails to explain mineness. Fortunately, these failures, when leavened by other findings (those that exhibit varieties and vagaries of mineness), intimate an approach better suited to searching for an explanation. Having an alternative in hand, one that shows promise of achieving explanatory adequacy, provides an additional reason to suspend the search for unique constituents. In short, a negative and a positive thesis are developed: we should cease looking for unique constituents and should seek to explain mineness in accord with the model developed here. This model rejects attempts to explain the phenomenon in terms of either a narrative or a minimal sense of self; it seeks to explain at a “molecular” level, one that appeals to multiple, interacting dimensions. The molecular-level model allows for the possibility that subjective perspective is distinct from a stark perspective (one that does not imply mineness). It proposes that the confounding of tacit expectations plays an important role in explaining mental ownership and its complement, disownership. But the confounding of tacit expectations is not sufficient. Because we are able to be aware of the existence of mental states that do not belong to self, we require a mechanism for determining degree of self-relatedness. One such mechanism is proposed here, and it is shown how this mechanism can be integrated into a general model of mental ownership. In the spirit of suggesting how this model might be able to help resolve outstanding problems, the question as to whether inserted thoughts belong to the patient who reports them is also considered.
机译:对自我的专有方面(排他性或精神所有权)的哲学和科学研究通常以寻找独特的成分为生产策略为前提。但是似乎没有任何独特的组成部分。在此,强调主观视角的“自我特异性”范式失败了。以前,有人争辩说,访问方式也不能解释地雷。幸运的是,当这些失败与其他发现(那些表现出多样性和矿产变幻莫测的发现)相提并论时,便形成了一种更适合寻求解释的方法。有了另一种选择,即表明有望实现解释性的充分性,这提供了暂停寻找独特成分的另一个原因。简而言之,提出了消极和积极的论断:我们应该停止寻找独特的成分,并根据本文开发的模型寻求解释地雷。这个模型拒绝了用叙事或最小的自我意识来解释现象的尝试。它试图在一个“分子”层面上进行解释,该层面吸引了多个相互作用的维度。分子水平模型考虑了主观视角与鲜明视角(不代表矿难)的可能性。它提出,隐性期望的混淆在解释精神所有权及其补充,无权方面起着重要作用。但是,默认期望的混淆是不够的。因为我们能够意识到不属于自我的精神状态的存在,所以我们需要一种确定自我关联程度的机制。本文提出了一种这样的机制,并说明了如何将该机制整合到精神所有权的一般模型中。本着建议该模型如何能够帮助解决悬而未决的问题的精神,还考虑了有关插入的想法是否属于报告这些想法的患者的问题。

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