首页> 外文期刊>Parallel and Distributed Systems, IEEE Transactions on >Online Auction for IaaS Clouds: Towards Elastic User Demands and Weighted Heterogeneous VMs
【24h】

Online Auction for IaaS Clouds: Towards Elastic User Demands and Weighted Heterogeneous VMs

机译:IaaS云在线拍卖:满足弹性用户需求和加权异构VM

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       

摘要

Auctions have been adopted by many major cloud providers, such as Amazon EC2. Unfortunately, only simple auctions have been implemented. Such simple auction has serious limitations, such as being unable to accept elastic user demands and having to allocate different types of VMs independently. These limitations create a big gap between the real needs of cloud users and the available services of cloud providers. In response to the limitations of the existing auction mechanisms, this paper proposes a novel online auction mechanism for IaaS clouds, with the unique features of an elastic model for inputting time-varying user demands and a unified model for requesting heterogeneous VMs together. However, several major challenges should be addressed, such as NP hardness of optimal VM allocation, time-varying user demands and potential misreports of private information of cloud users. We propose a truthful online auction mechanism for maximizing the profit of the cloud provider in IaaS clouds, which is composed of a price-based allocation rule and a payment rule. In the allocation rule, the online auction mechanism determines the number of VMs of each type to each user. In the payment rule, by introducing a marginal price function for each type of VMs, the mechanism determines how much the cloud provider should charge each cloud user. With solid theoretical analysis and trace-driven simulations, we demonstrate that our mechanism is truthful, fair and individually rational, and has a polynomial-time complexity. In addition, our auction achieves a competitive ratio for the profit of the cloud provider, compared against the offline optimal one.
机译:拍卖已被许多主要的云提供商采用,例如Amazon EC2。不幸的是,仅实施了简单的拍卖。这种简单的拍卖具有严重的局限性,例如无法接受弹性的用户需求以及必须独立分配不同类型的VM。这些限制在云用户的实际需求与云提供商的可用服务之间造成了很大的差距。针对现有拍卖机制的局限性,本文提出了一种新颖的IaaS云在线拍卖机制,具有输入时变用户需求的弹性模型和共同请求异构VM的统一模型的独特功能。但是,应解决几个主要挑战,例如最佳VM分配的NP难度,随时间变化的用户需求以及云用户私有信息的潜在错误报告。我们提出了一种真实的在线拍卖机制,以最大化IaaS云中的云提供商的利润,该机制由基于价格的分配规则和付款规则组成。在分配规则中,在线拍卖机制确定给每个用户的每种类型的VM的数量。在支付规则中,通过为每种类型的VM引入边际价格函数,该机制确定了云提供商应向每个云用户收取多少费用。通过扎实的理论分析和跟踪驱动的模拟,我们证明了我们的机制是真实的,公平的和个体合理的,并且具有多项式时间复杂性。此外,与离线最佳竞价相比,我们的竞价在云提供商的利润上具有竞争优势。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号