Next Generation Safeguards Initiative research to determine the Pu mass in spent fuel assemblies: Purpose, approach, constraints, implementation, and calibration

摘要

The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) of the U.S. Department of Energy has funded a multi-lab/multi-university collaboration to quantify the plutonium mass in spent nuclear fuel assemblies and to detect the diversion of pins from them. The goal of this research effort is to quantify the capability of various non-destructive assay (NDA) technologies as well as to train a future generation of safeguards practitioners. This research is "technology driven" in the sense that we will quantify the capabilities of a wide range of safeguards technologies of interest to regulators and policy makers; a key benefit to this approach is that the techniques are being tested in a unified manner. When the results of the Monte Carlo modeling are evaluated and integrated, practical constraints are part of defining the potential context in which a given technology might be applied. This paper organizes the commercial spent fuel safeguard needs into four facility types in order to identify any constraints on the NDA system design. These four facility types are the following: future reprocessing plants, current reprocessing plants, once-through spent fuel repositories, and any other sites that store individual spent fuel assemblies (reactor sites are the most common facility type in this category). Dry storage is not of interest since individual assemblies are not accessible. This paper will overview the purpose and approach of the NGSI spent fuel effort and describe the constraints inherent in commercial fuel facilities. It will conclude by discussing implementation and calibration of measurement systems. This report will also provide some motivation for considering a couple of other safeguards concepts (base measurement and fingerprinting) that might meet the safeguards need but not require the determination of plutonium mass.