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Contractual Agreements for Coordination and Vendor-Managed Delivery under Explicit Transportation Considerations

机译:明确运输考虑下的协调和供应商管理的交货合同协议

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We consider the coordination problem between a vendor and a buyer operating under generalized replenishment costs that include fixed costs as well as stepwise freight costs. We study the stochastic demand, single-period setting where the buyer must decide on the order quantity to satisfy random demand for a single item with a short product life cycle. The full order for the cycle is placed before the cycle begins and no additional orders are accepted by the vendor. Due to the nonrecurring nature of the problem, the vendor's replenishment quantity is determined by the buyer's order quantity. Consequently, by using an appropriate pricing schedule to influence the buyer's ordering behavior, there is an opportunity for the vendor to achieve substantial savings from transportation expenses, which are represented in the generalized replenishment cost function. For the problem of interest, we prove that the vendor's expected profit is not increasing in buyer's order quantity. Therefore, unlike the earlier work in the area, it is not necessarily profitable for the vendor to encourage larger order quantities. Using this nontraditional result, we demonstrate that the concept of economies of scale may or may not work by identifying the cases where the vendor can increase his/her profits either by increasing or decreasing the buyer's order quantity. We prove useful properties of the expected profit functions in the centralized and decentralized models of the problem, and we utilize these properties to develop alternative incentive schemes for win-win solutions. Our analysis allows us to quantify the value of coordination and, hence, to identify additional opportunities for the vendor to improve his/her profits by potentially turning a nonprofitable transaction into a profitable one through the use of an appropriate tariff schedule or a vendor-managed delivery contract. We demonstrate that financial gain associated with these opportunities is truly tangible under a vendor-managed delivery arrangement that potentially improves the centralized solution. Although we take the viewpoint of supply chain coordination and our goal is to provide insights about the effect of transportation considerations on the channel coordination objective and contractual agreements, the paper also contributes to the literature by analyzing and developing efficient approaches for solving the centralized problem with stepwise freight costs in the single-period setting.
机译:我们考虑了在一般补货成本(包括固定成本和逐步运费)下运作的卖方和买方之间的协调问题。我们研究随机需求的单周期设置,在这种情况下,购买者必须决定订单数量,才能满足产品生命周期短的单个项目的随机需求。周期的完整订单已在周期开始之前下达,供应商不接受其他任何订单。由于问题的非重复性,卖方的补货数量由买方的订货数量决定。因此,通过使用适当的定价时间表来影响买方的订购行为,卖方就有机会从运输费用中获得可观的节省,这在广义的补货成本函数中得以体现。对于利息问题,我们证明卖方的预期利润不会增加买方的订货数量。因此,与该地区的早期工作不同,卖方鼓励更大的订货量不一定能获利。使用这种非传统的结果,我们通过确定卖方可以通过增加或减少买方的订购数量来增加其利润的情况,来证明规模经济的概念可能有效,也可能无效。我们在问题的集中式和分散式模型中证明了预期利润函数的有用性质,并且我们利用这些性质来开发双赢解决方案的替代激励方案。我们的分析使我们能够量化协调的价值,因此,可以通过使用适当的价目表或由卖方管理的交易,通过潜在地将无利可图的交易变成有利可图的交易,为卖方确定增加利润的机会。交货合同。我们证明,在供应商管理的交付安排下,与这些机会相关的财务收益确实是有形的,有可能改善集中式解决方案。尽管我们从供应链协调的角度出发,我们的目标是提供有关运输注意事项对渠道协调目标和合同协议的影响的见解,但本文还通过分析和开发有效的方法来解决集中化问题,从而为文献做出了贡献。单周期设置中的逐步运费。

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