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Reward or Penalty: Aligning Incentives of Stakeholders in Crowdsourcing

机译:奖励或惩罚:在众包中调整利益相关者的激励

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摘要

Crowdsourcing is a promising platform, whereby massive tasks are broadcasted to a crowd of semi-skilled workers by the requester for reliable solutions. In this paper, we consider four key evaluation indices of a crowdsourcing community (i.e., quality, cost, latency, and platform improvement), and demonstrate that these indices involve the interests of the three stakeholders, namely the requester, worker, and crowdsourcing platform. Since the incentives among these three stakeholders always conflict with each other, to elevate the long-term development of the crowdsourcing community, we take the perspective of the whole crowdsourcing community, and design a crowdsourcing mechanism to align incentives of stakeholders together. Specifically, we give workers reward or penalty according to their reporting solutions instead of only nonnegative payment. Furthermore, we find a series of proper reward-penalty function pairs and compute workers personal order values, which can provide different amounts of reward and penalty according to both the workers reporting beliefs and their individual history performances, and keep the incentive of workers at the same time. The proposed mechanism can help latency control, promote quality and platform evolution of crowdsourcing community, and improve the aforementioned four key evaluation indices. Theoretical analysis and experimental results are provided to validate and evaluate the proposed mechanism, respectively.
机译:众包是一个有前途的平台,请求者可以将大量任务广播给一群半熟练的工人,以寻求可靠的解决方案。在本文中,我们考虑了众包社区的四个关键评估指标(即质量,成本,延迟和平台改进),并证明了这些指标涉及到三个利益相关者的利益,即请求者,工作人员和众包平台。由于这三个利益相关者之间的激励机制总是相互冲突,以提升众包社区的长期发展,因此,我们从整个众包社区的角度出发,设计了一种众包机制,以使利益相关者的激励机制保持一致。具体来说,我们根据工人的举报解决方案给予他们奖励或惩罚,而不仅仅是非负数付款。此外,我们找到了一系列适当的奖惩函数对,并计算了工人的个人订单值,这些值可以根据报告工人的信念及其个人的历史表现提供不同程度的奖励和惩罚,并保持对工人的激励。同时。所提出的机制可以帮助控制时延,促进众包社区的质量和平台演进,并改善上述四个关键评估指标。提供理论分析和实验结果以分别验证和评估该机制。

著录项

  • 来源
    《IEEE transactions on mobile computing》 |2019年第4期|974-985|共12页
  • 作者单位

    Beijing Univ Posts & Telecommun, State Key Lab Networking & Switching Technol, Beijing Shi 100876, Peoples R China;

    Beijing Univ Posts & Telecommun, State Key Lab Networking & Switching Technol, Beijing Shi 100876, Peoples R China;

    Univ Waterloo, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada;

    Beijing Univ Posts & Telecommun, State Key Lab Networking & Switching Technol, Beijing Shi 100876, Peoples R China;

    Univ Waterloo, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada;

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Crowdsourcing; incentive; reward; penalty; belief;

    机译:众包激励奖励惩罚信仰;

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