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PLATFORM OR WHOLESALE? A STRATEGIC TOOL FOR ONLINE RETAILERS TO BENEFIT FROM THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION

机译:平台还是批发?在线零售商从第三方信息中受益的战略工具

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摘要

Online retailing is dominated by a channel structure in which a retailer either buys products from competing manufacturers and resells to consumers (wholesale scheme) or lets manufacturers sell directly to consumers on its platform for a commission (platform scheme). Easy access to publicly available third-party information such as product reviews that facilitate consumers' purchase decisions is another distinctive and ubiquitous characteristic of online retailing. We show that retailers can use the upstream pricing scheme, wholesale or platform, as a strategic tool to benefit from third-party information. Information on the quality dimension homogenizes consumers' perceived utility differences between competing products and increases the upstream competition, which benefits the wholesale-based retailer but hurts the platform-based retailer. Information on the fit dimension, in constrast, heterogenizes consumers' estimated fits to the products and softens the upstream competition, which hurts the wholesale-based retailer but benefits the platform-based retailer. Consequently, when the precision of the third-party information is high (low), a retailer can benefit from third-party information by adopting the wholesale (platform) scheme if the quality dimension plays a dominant role and by adopting the platform (wholesale) scheme if the fit dimension is dominant. Furthermore, the effect of precision improvement on the retailer's profit depends on the pricing-scheme choice and the relative importance of quality and fit attributes in consumers' evaluations of products. For instance, when the fit dimension is dominant, increasing the precision can hurt the wholesale-based retailer but benefit the platform-based retailer.
机译:在线零售以渠道结构为主导,零售商可以从竞争的制造商那里购买产品并转售给消费者(批发计划),也可以让制造商在其平台上直接向消费​​者出售以获得佣金(平台计划)。轻松访问可公开使用的第三方信息(例如有助于消费者做出购买决定的产品评论)是在线零售的另一个独特和普遍存在的特征。我们表明,零售商可以使用上游定价方案,批发或平台作为从第三方信息中受益的战略工具。有关质量维度的信息使消费者对竞争产品之间的效用差异感到同质,并增加了上游竞争,这使批发零售商受益,但伤害了平台零售商。相反,关于合身维度的信息使消费者对产品的合身估计不均一,并软化了上游竞争,这伤害了批发零售商,但有益于平台零售商。因此,当第三方信息的准确性高(低)时,如果质量维度起主导作用,零售商可以通过采用批发(平台)方案并通过采用平台(批发)来从第三方信息中受益。如果合适的尺寸占主导地位,则采用该方案。此外,精确度提高对零售商利润的影响取决于定价方案的选择以及质量和适合属性在消费者对产品评估中的相对重要性。例如,当装配尺寸占主导地位时,提高精度可能会损害批发零售商,但会使平台零售商受益。

著录项

  • 来源
    《MIS quarterly》 |2017年第3期|763-785|共23页
  • 作者单位

    Univ Florida, Warrington Coll Business, 1454 Union Rd, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA;

    Univ Texas Dallas, Jindal Sch Management, 800 West Campbell Rd, Richardson, TX 75080 USA;

    Univ Texas Dallas, Jindal Sch Management, 800 West Campbell Rd, Richardson, TX 75080 USA;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);美国《工程索引》(EI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Third-party information; pricing scheme; online reviews; competition; game theory;

    机译:第三方信息;定价方案;在线评论;竞争;博弈论;
  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 13:16:45

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