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On the existence of almost-pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in n-person finite games

机译:关于n人有限博弈中几乎纯策略的纳什均衡的存在

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This paper gives wide characterization of n-person non-coalitional games with finite players’ strategy spaces and payoff functions having some concavity or convexity properties. The characterization is done in terms of the existence of two-point-strategy Nash equilibria, that is equilibria consisting only of mixed strategies with supports being one or two-point sets of players’ pure strategy spaces. The structure of such simple equilibria is discussed in different cases. The results obtained in the paper can be seen as a discrete counterpart of Glicksberg’s theorem and other known results about the existence of pure (or “almost pure”) Nash equilibria in continuous concave (convex) games with compact convex spaces of players’ pure strategies.
机译:本文给出了具有有限玩家策略空间和具有一定凹凸性质的收益函数的n人非联盟游戏的广泛特征。表征是根据两点策略纳什均衡的存在而完成的,纳什均衡仅由混合策略组成,其支持是一或两点玩家的纯策略空间集。在不同情况下讨论了这种简单平衡的结构。本文获得的结果可以看作是Glicksberg定理的离散对立项,也可以看作是关于连续凹(凸)游戏中纯(或“几乎纯”)纳什均衡存在的其他已知结果,该连续凹(凸)游戏具有玩家纯策略的紧凑凸空间。 。

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