NOISY—VS.—SILENT DUEL AND SILENT—VS.—NOISY DUEL UNDER ARBITRARY MOVING

摘要

This paper deals with two types of the two-person zero-sum timing games. Each of players Ⅰ and Ⅱ has a gun with one bullet and they fight a duel. Two players are one distance apart at time 0. Player Ⅰ can move as he likes and player Ⅱ is motionless. In the first game, player Ⅰ's gun is noisy and player Ⅱ's gun is silent. And in the second one, player Ⅰ's gun is silent and player Ⅱ's gun is noisy. For these two games, the game value and the optimal or ε-optimal strategies for each player are obtained.