Is the catch quota management (CQM) mechanism attractive to fishers? A preliminary analysis of the Danish 2011 CQM trial project

摘要

There is a demand for a management mechanism that can reduce the discarding problems of EU fisheries. Catch quota management (CQM) seems to be a promising candidate for such a mechanism. Drawing on a principal-agent model, the objective of this study is to develop and test a method for investigating if the CQM mechanism is efficient in providing fishers with incentives for participating in CQM and complying with the rules. The study uses the 2011 Danish CQM trial project as its empirical basis. The results indicate that CQM fishers have a higher average gross income compared to fishers harvesting according to the conventional rules. Hence, there is an incentive for fishers to participate in the trial. However, with the possibility to cheat, CQM fishers may achieve even higher gross income. It is not obvious that the CQM mechanism's payoff structure (incentives) is attractive enough to ensure that the fishers comply with the rules. The empirical data illustrate that without discarding the CQM fishers achieve a lower average price for their catches. Therefore, to make the CQM mechanism sufficiently attractive to fishers, the participating fishers must be compensated. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.