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Manufacturer's Entry in the Product-Sharing Market

机译:制造商在产品共享市场中的进入

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Problem definition: Mobile communications technologies and online platforms have enabled large-scale consumer-to-consumer (C2C) sharing of their underutilized products. This paper studies a manufacturer's optimal entry strategy in the product-sharing market and the economic implications of its entry. Academic/practical relevance: Sharing of products or services among consumers has experienced dramatic growth in recent years. The impact of C2C sharing on traditional firms can be very significant. In response to C2C product sharing, many manufacturers (e.g., General Motors and BMW) have entered the product-sharing market to provide business-to-consumer (B2C) rental services in addition to outright sales to consumers. Methodology: We employ a game-theoretic analytical model for our analysis. Results: Our analysis shows that when C2C sharing has a low transaction cost and the manufacturer's marginal cost of production is not very high, the manufacturer will find it not optimal to offer its own rental services to consumers. In contrast, when the C2C sharing transaction cost is high or the manufacturer's marginal cost of production is high, the manufacturer should offer enough units of the products for rental to squeeze out C2C sharing (in expectation). When the C2C-sharing transaction cost and the manufacturer's marginal cost are both in the middle ranges, the manufacturer's rental services and the C2C sharing will coexist, in which case the manufacturer's entry in the sharing market may reduce the total number of units of the product in the whole market, but increase the consumer surplus and the social welfare. This reduced number of products due to the manufacturer's B2C rental service also suggests less environmental impact from production. Managerial implications: The production cost and the C2C sharing transaction cost play critical roles in determining the manufacturer's optimal quantity to use for its B2C rental services and the equilibrium outcome. In some situations, the manufacturer's entry in the sharing market provides not only economic benefits to the firm and consumers, but also environmental benefits to the society as a whole.
机译:问题定义:移动通信技术和在线平台已启用大规模的消费者(C2C)共享其未充分利用的产品。本文研究了制造商在产品共享市场中的最佳进入策略以及其进入的经济影响。学术/实际相关性:近年来消费者的产品或服务的分享经历了戏剧性的增长。 C2C共享对传统公司的影响可能非常显着。为了回应C2C产品共享,许多制造商(例如,通用汽车和宝马)已进入产品共享市场,以便为消费者彻底销售外,为消费者(B2C)租赁服务提供。方法论:我们采用了一个游戏理论分析模型进行了分析。结果:我们的分析表明,当C2C共享具有低交易成本和制造商的生产率不高的情况下,制造商会发现为消费者提供自己的租赁服务而不是最佳。相比之下,当C2C共享交易成本高或制造商的边际生产成本很高时,制造商应提供足够的产品单位,以避免C2C共享(期望)。当C2C共享交易成本和制造商的边际成本都在中间范围内,制造商的租赁服务和C2C分享将共存,在这种情况下,制造商在共享市场中的入境可能会减少产品单位的总数在整个市场,但增加了消费者盈余和社会福利。由于制造商的B2C租赁服务,这一减少的产品数量也表明对生产的影响较差。管理含义:生产成本和C2C共享交易成本在确定制造商的最佳数量和B2C租赁服务和均衡结果时发挥关键作用。在某些情况下,制造商在共享市场的条目不仅为公司和消费者提供了经济效益,而且还为整个社会的环境效益提供了环境效益。

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