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Rewarding Suppliers' Performance via Allocation of Business

机译:通过分配业务奖励供应商的绩效

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摘要

biProblem definition : Buyers can encourage competition among multiple suppliers of goods or services by redistributing their shares of the business based on recent observable performances. This is usually needed because actual efforts or investments by suppliers are typically unobservable, a moral hazard issue. This poses the problem: How should such redistribution be linked to the suppliers’ recent performances to motivate the best supplier performance? biAcademic/practical relevance : Such performance-based allocations of business are a common practice in supply management when a buyer sources from multiple suppliers. But there is little research on the structural characteristics of the optimal allocation rule in the presence of moral hazard. biMethodology : We apply principal-agent theory to model the buyer’s incentive design problem. We analytically derive the optimal allocation rule and conduct numerical experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of several simple heuristics against the optimal rule. biResults : Our key result is that the buyer should divide the purchase among suppliers based on their relative performance deviations from the targets set by the buyer. A ratio rule is used for positive deviations, whereas a winner-take-all may be applied when some suppliers underperform. Our result generalizes to a range of environments with different cost structures, distributions of performance outcomes, correlated performance, etc. When the optimal rule is used to benchmark several more practical heuristics, the only really poorly performing heuristic is one that does not use the relative performance deviations. biManagerial implications : Buyers’ allocations should reflect suppliers’ relative performance deviations from the desired targets, not absolute performances. Performance deviations can be weighted in some way, but this is a second-order gain. A ratio rule is needed to reward good performance, whereas a winner-take-all rule with more extreme allocations is used for penalizing poor performance.
机译:问题定义:买家可以通过根据最近可观察的表演重新分配业务股票来鼓励多家商品或服务的竞争。这通常需要,因为供应商的实际努力或投资通常是不可观察的,道德危险问题。这造成了问题:这种重新分配应该如何链接到供应商最近的表现,以激励最好的供应商绩效? 学术/实际相关性:这种基于绩效的业务分配是当来自多个供应商的买方来源时提供管理的常见做法。但是对道德风险存在的最佳分配规则的结构特征几乎没有研究。 方法:我们应用主代理理论来模拟买方的激励设计问题。我们分析了最佳分配规则,并进行数值实验,以评估几种简单启发式的有效性。 结果:我们的关键结果是,买方应根据与买方设定的目标的相对性能偏差分配供应商之间的购买。比率规则用于积极偏差,而在某些供应商表现下可能会应用胜利者。我们的结果推广到一系列具有不同成本结构的环境,性能结果分布,相关性能等。当最佳规则用于基准测试几个更实用的启发式时,表现唯一的表现不佳的启发式是不使用相对的性能偏差。 管理意义:买家的拨款应反映供应商与所需目标的相对性能偏差,而不是绝对性能。性能偏差可以以某种方式加权,但这是二阶增益。需要比率规则来奖励良好的性能,而具有更极端分配的胜利者所有规则用于惩罚性能不佳。

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