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Fee-for-Service Contracts in Pharmaceutical Distribution Supply Chains: Design, Analysis, and Management

机译:药品分销供应链中的有偿服务合同:设计,分析和管理

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摘要

Fee-for-service (FFS) contracts, first introduced in 2004, dramatically changed the way the pharmaceutical distribution supply chains are designed, managed, and operated. Investment buying (IB), forward buying in anticipation of drug price increases, used to be the way the distributors made most of their profits. FFS contracts limit the amount of inventory distributors can carry at any time (by imposing an inventory cap) and require inventory information sharing from the distributors to the manufacturers while compensating the distributors with a per-unit fee. In spite of its widespread popularity, the FFS model has never been rigorously analyzed or its effectiveness carefully tabulated. In this paper, we formulate the multiperiod stochastic inventory problems faced by the manufacturer and the distributor under the FFS and IB models, derive their optimal policies, and develop procedures to compute the policy parameters. We show that FFS contracts can improve the total supply chain profit—'the manufacturer and distributor are now able to share a larger pie. Thus, there exists a range of the per-unit fees that leads to Pareto improvement. Simulation results show that such improvement is approximately 1.7% on average, and as much as 5.5%, and the improvement increases as the inventory cap decreases. Determining the Pareto-improving per-unit fees is a source of contention in FFS contract negotiation, and we propose a simple yet effective heuristic for computing them. Furthermore, supply chain transparency facilitated by the FFS contracts can significantly reduce the manufacturer's supply-demand mismatch costs (by approximately 3.63% on average and as much as 13.01%) and we show that the manufacturer should take advantage of this transparency especially when the inventory cap and drug price increase are high and demand variance is low. We believe that these results have the potential to improve the efficiency of pharmaceutical distribution supply chains, thus reducing the healthcare costs that are such a big burden on the U.S. economy.
机译:服务费(FFS)合同于2004年首次推出,大大改变了药品分销供应链的设计,管理和运营方式。投资购买(IB)是指预期药品价格上涨的远期购买,过去是分销商获得大部分利润的方式。 FFS合同限制了分销商可以随时携带的库存量(通过施加库存上限),并且要求从分销商向制造商共享库存信息,同时以每单位的费用补偿分销商。尽管FFS模型广受欢迎,但从未对其进行严格的分析或对其有效性进行仔细的制表。在本文中,我们在FFS和IB模型下,制定了制造商和分销商面临的多周期随机库存问题,得出了它们的最优策略,并开发了计算策略参数的程序。我们证明,FFS合同可以改善整个供应链的利润-制造商和分销商现在可以分担更大的蛋糕。因此,存在各种导致帕累托改进的单位费用。仿真结果表明,这种改进平均约为1.7%,最高可达5.5%,并且随着库存上限的降低而提高。在FFS合同谈判中,确定帕累托改进的每单位费用是争论的源头,我们提出了一种简单而有效的启发式计算方法。此外,FFS合同促成的供应链透明度可以显着降低制造商的供需错配成本(平均减少约3.63%,多达13.01%),并且我们证明制造商应利用这种透明度,尤其是在库存上限和药品价格上涨幅度很高,需求差异很小。我们认为,这些结果有可能提高药品分销供应链的效率,从而降低医疗保健成本,而这对美国经济造成了沉重负担。

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