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Who Should Finance the Supply Chain? Impact of Credit Ratings on Supply Chain Decisions

机译:谁应该为供应链融资?信用评级对供应链决策的影响

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Problem description: We study the impact of credit ratings on operational and financial decisions of a supply chain with a supplier and a retailer interacting via an early payment discount contract. The retailer has a single opportunity to order a product from the supplier to satisfy future uncertain demand. Both the retailer and supplier are capital constrained, and the retailer can use both short-term bank loans and trade credits for his financing needs, while the supplier can use short-term bank loans and/or the retailers early payment. We analyze for all relevant operational decisions (wholesale price, trade credit rates, bank loans, and order quantity) for capital-constrained firms. Academic/practical relevance: We add a framework on who should finance inventories, and at what rates, in the presence of differential credit ratings of the supply chain parties. Methodology: Within a modified selling to the newsvendor Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader, we derive the equilibrium trade credit rates, wholesale price, bank loans, and order quantity. Results: We show there exists a threshold such that if the supplier's credit rating is above it, then the supplier offers trade credits with zero interest rate and the retailer uses trade credits only. Otherwise, the supplier sets a positive rate, which motivates the retailer to combine trade credits and bank loans. The supplier always benefits from working with good rating retailers. A retailer prefers to work with suppliers outside the supplier's credit rating hole (a finite set of ratings) over suppliers with ratings within the range. Managerial implications: We provide insights on who should finance supply chain inventories and at what rates when there are differential credit rating between the supplier and retailer. We provide a plausible explanation for the practice of large and good credit rating retailers maintaining a small cash ratio and working with small suppliers in developing countries.
机译:问题描述:我们研究了信用评级对供应商的运营和财务决策的影响,其中供应商和零售商通过提前付款折扣合同进行交互。零售商只有一次机会可以从供应商处订购产品,以满足未来不确定的需求。零售商和供应商都受到资金的限制,零售商可以使用短期银行贷款和贸易信贷来满足其融资需求,而供应商可以使用短期银行贷款和/或零售商提早付款。我们分析了资本受限企业的所有相关运营决策(批发价格,贸易信贷利率,银行贷款和订单数量)。学术/实践相关性:在存在供应链各方信用等级不同的情况下,我们添加了一个框架,确定谁应该为库存提供资金以及以什么比率提供资金。方法:在以供应商为领导者的新闻卖方Stackelberg游戏的变型销售中,我们得出均衡的贸易信贷利率,批发价格,银行贷款和订单数量。结果:我们显示存在一个阈值,如果供应商的信用等级高于该阈值,则供应商将提供零利率的贸易信用,而零售商仅使用贸易信用。否则,供应商会设定一个正利率,这会促使零售商结合贸易信贷和银行贷款。供应商始终可以从与信誉良好的零售商合作中受益。与评级范围内的供应商相比,零售商更愿意与供应商的信用评级漏洞(一组有限的评级)之外的供应商合作。对管理的影响:当供应商和零售商之间的信用评级存在差异时,我们将提供有关谁应该为供应链库存提供资金以及以什么比率资助的见解。我们为信誉良好的大型和大型零售商维持较低现金比率并与发展中国家的小型供应商合作提供了合理的解释。

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