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Political connections, the cost of debt and board attributes: evidence from Malaysia

机译:政治关系,债务成本和董事会属性:来自马来西亚的证据

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Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the relationship between politically connected firms (PCFs) and the cost of debt is moderated by board attributes such as audit committee independence, ethnic board diversity, gender board diversity and family controlling ownership. Design/methodology/approach - This study employs ordinary least squares model to examine the moderating effect of audit committee independence on the association between PCFs and the cost of debt; moderating effect of ethnic board diversity on the association between PCFs and the cost of debt; moderating effect of gender board diversity on the association between PCFs and the cost of debt; and moderating effect of family-controlled boards on the association between PCFs and the cost of debt. Findings - The results show that PCFs are associated with lower cost of debt, consistent with crony capitalism theory. Furthermore, board attributes are shown to have significant moderating effect on the association between PCFs and the cost of debt. Specifically, the cost of debt in PCFs can be further reduced, provided the boards have higher audit committee independence, are ethnically diverse, have higher proportion of female directors in the board and audit committee and are controlled by family shareholders. Originality/value - This study reveals evidence on the impact of board attributes on the cost of debt in PCFs. All findings suggest that concerns on PCFs' severe agency problems can be alleviated through effective monitoring. The significant board attributes that facilitate effective monitoring are audit committee independence, ethnic board diversity, gender board diversity and family ownership.
机译:目的-本文的目的是研究政治联系公司(PCF)与债务成本之间的关系是否受到董事会属性的调节,例如审计委员会的独立性,种族委员会的多样性,性别委员会的多样性以及家族控制所有权。设计/方法/方法-本研究采用普通最小二乘模型来检验审计委员会独立性对PCF与债务成本之间的关联的调节作用;民族委员会多样性对PCF和债务成本之间的关联的调节作用;性别委员会的多样性对PCF与债务成本之间的关联的调节作用;家族控制董事会对PCF和债务成本之间的关联的调节作用。研究结果-结果表明,无抵押信贷资产与较低的债务成本相关联,这与裙带资本主义理论是一致的。此外,显示出董事会属性对PCF和债务成本之间的关联具有显着的调节作用。具体来说,只要董事会具有更高的审计委员会独立性,种族多元化,董事会和审计委员会中女性董事比例更高并由家族股东控制,则可以进一步降低PCF的债务成本。原创性/价值-这项研究揭示了董事会属性对PCF债务成本的影响的证据。所有发现均表明,通过有效的监测可以减轻对PCF严重代理问题的担忧。促进有效监督的重要董事会属性是审计委员会的独立性,种族委员会的多元化,性别委员会的多元化和家庭所有权。

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