Ex-post governance in joint ventures: Determinants of monitoring by JV boards of directors

摘要

Considerable advances have been made in corporate governance research in recent years and opportunities exist to consider these developments within alliances. We extend the "scope of operations" hypothesis to the domain of joint ventures. This proposition suggests that the monitoring carried out by boards increases when organizations become more complex. The inherent characteristics of JVs generate unique sources of complexity that are currently unexplored in the corporate governance literature. First, we seek to determine their influence on monitoring by using primary data on JV board monitoring. Second, we adopt the size of JV boards as a proxy for monitoring in order to examine whether the determinants of board size and monitoring in fact coincide and to reveal if certain effects are masked by using board size as a simple proxy for monitoring. Doing so enables us to investigate the black-box of what boards actually do as well as extend governance research to other organizational forms. Our findings confirm that the unique characteristics of JVs influence the information needs by the boards resulting in more monitoring by JV directors. Our findings show there is value in bridging alliance theory and the literature on corporate governance research. We also advance practitioner's understanding by providing suggestions on how to structure JV boards in relation to their complexity. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.