Common pool water resources management consideringrna regulator interference: A game theory approach tornderive managerial policies for Urmia lake, Iran

摘要

An increased need for water, combined with a scarcity of water resources, has resulted in serious challenges regardingrnwater resource management. Those issues have always been a major concern of most research regarding the managementrnand operation of water resources. Various qualitative and quantitative methods, Game Theory (GT) being an example,rnhave been proposed for managing common pool water resources. This study adopts GT to address a case ofrncommon pool water resource management, including consideration of the interference of a regulator. Urmia lake inrnnorth-western Iran was chosen as an illustration of a common source of water shared between two provinces acting as littoralrnstakeholders to the lake. Due to a non-cooperative behaviour of the stakeholders, the lake is most likely to dry up.rnTo change the game situation, a regulator was inserted into the game as a third player. The game among players isrninvestigated in terms of two static and dynamic game methods. Two strategies are defined for each player. The equilibriumrnpoint will be achieved according to the strategies adopted by the players. For static games, a low-level equilibriumrnunder non-cooperation conditions is obtained. Dynamic games among players are more likely to occur, rather than staticrngames. The equilibrium of high-level productivity will be obtained under cooperative conditions among the players.